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It is well known that, in order to take advantage of positive externalities, local
jurisdictions are willing to o¤er subsidies with the aim of attracting new pro-
duction plants to their site. This results in multinational corporations (MNCs)
holding simultaneous negotiations with di¤erent local jurisdictions’ authorities
within a given country to …nd out which one o¤ers the most pro…table conditions
for the installation of a new production plant1.
There is substantial evidence of this kind of subsidy competition. For ex-
ample, in 1993 the state of Indiana packaged a $300 million deal to attract a
United Airlines maintenance facility expected to create 6,300 jobs, while Ken-
tucky issued $140 million in potential tax credits to attract 400 steel jobs (Wall
Street Journal, July 6, 1993). A survey of regional incentives programs im-
plemented in other OECD countries can be found in Chandler and Trebilcock
(1986). There is also evidence that this intergovernmental competition is quite
common between municipalities, which enter ’bidding wars’ using …rm-speci…c
agreements to attract plants (King, et al. (1993)).
There is also an existing literature that, using di¤erent set-ups, models this
subsidy competition to attract MNCs to particular locations. For example,
Bond and Samuelson (1986) and Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1984) model the
fact that the tax competition between countries takes the form of a tax holi-
day. King and Welling (1992) examine a two-period model in which two regions
compete simultaneously in each period. Closer to our approach, Barros and
Cabral (2000) analyse ”subsidy games” between countries in order to attract
foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. They do welfare compar-
isons between the equilibria achieved by competitive subsidy, zero subsidy, and
…rst-best subsidy.
In the present paper we are interested in the particular case where the central
government of the country intervenes in this competition process in order to
protect the national interest. To the best of my knowledge, Adams and Regibeau
(1998) is the only paper that considers such a central government intervention.
In a context of the tari¤-jumping argument for FDI and the possibility that the
local authorities o¤er subsidies in order to attract MNCs, their paper tries to
determine what the optimal import tari¤ is. Indeed, a puzzling stylised fact is
that central governments favour some regions and not others even when they
are similar in terms of, say, level of development and strategic location.
The widespread use of special economic zones by countries all around the
world is an important evidence for this type of asymmetric treatment. The priv-
ileges that these special economic zones enjoy give them signi…cant competitive
advantages relative to other non-favoured areas2. Indeed, the best example of
1However, a similar situation could be found in the new economic blocs like the EU,
NAFTA, or Mercosur, where the jurisdictions are the countries that form the blocs.
2According to the ILO database (1993) the number of, what they call, export processing
zones and the number of countries hosting them, have expanded rapidly. Thus, there are now
more than 1000export processing zones spread around more than 100countries and employing
more 40 million people.
1this particular asymmetric treatment can be found in China, where at the be-
ginning of the 1980’s the central government gave special economic privileges to
three cities in Guangdong, one in Fujian, and none in Guangxi (see Litwack and
Qian, 1998). In this case the asymmetric treatment was applies even though
there was no apparent di¤erence between the three regions in terms of develop-
ment or strategic location. Another more recent but less successful example is
the creation of three special economic zones in Russia in 1997 (i.e. in the Kalin-
ingrad, Nakhodka, and Ingushetia regions). Thus, knowing that a symmetric
treatment of similar regions would be desirable in terms of a more even regional
development, why the asymmetric policy is chosen instead? Is it because it
generates a higher aggregate welfare than the symmetric one?
The main purpose of the present paper is to show that, under certain cir-
cumstances, this is indeed the case. The principle underlying this result in our
model is that an asymmetric tax treatment of similar regions is more e¤ective
than a symmetric one in reducing the adverse e¤ect that the subsidy competition
between the regions has on the country’s welfare. For, in some circumstances,
it reduces the bargaining power of the MNC.
Another worth mentioning result that emerges from our model is that, un-
der some circumstances, the optimal central government policy generates a mis-
match between a particular region and a MNC. By mismatch we mean a sit-
uation where, even though one MNC is more productive in one region, due to
the central government’s optimal policy it goes to the other one. The existence
of mismatches contrasts with the solution when there is no central government
intervention, in which case this never happens. This interesting result stems
from the fact that in our model the central government has imperfect informa-
tion about the type of MNC that is coming to the country. This implies that
the taxes set ex-ante by the central government have to be conditional on the
regions ultimately chosen by the MNC and not on their own type. Then, the
central government faces a trade-o¤ between reducing the inter-region subsidy
competition and achieving the best match between region and MNC. In some
situations the achievement of the former target gives rise to a mismatch. This
result seems to support some critics’ views that privileges given to particular
regions are made at the cost of creating ine¢ciencies in the regional alloca-
tion of resources. However, in our model, this comes as a result of the central
government applying a policy that maximises the country’s welfare.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The basic model is presented in
Section 2. The …rst part of this section we begins by assuming one country with
two identical regions, but the regions are allowed to di¤er in the second part.
In Section 3 the main results of the model are discussed. Section 4 concludes
and makes suggestions for further research.
2 The model
We assume a two-stage game involving the central government, two regions (i.e.
1 and 2), and an MNC. In the …rst stage, the central government determines the
2lump sum taxes to be imposed on the MNC3 in each of the regions in order to
maximise the country’s welfare4, which is equal to the local welfare (externality
minus regional subsidy) plus the central government tax. In the second stage,
the MNC bargains with the two regional governments on the level of the lump
sum subsidies to be paid by the winning region5. Initially we assume that the
MNC makes no pre-subsidy pro…t and it only generates positive externalities
to the host region. Each regional government maximises its own utility, which
is equal to the externality produced by the MNC minus the subsidy6. Suppose
that, in this stage of the game, all players have perfect information. This means
that the externality produced by the MNC in each region, the taxes imposed by
the central government in the …rst stage of the game, and the payo¤ that the
MNC obtains if it does not invest in the country are common knowledge. For
simplicity, the later is assumed to be zero.
To model the three-player bargaining process in which each regional govern-
ment bids a lump-sum subsidy to attract a MNC, we use a version of the non-
cooperative bargaining approach developed by Bolton and Whinston (1993). In
our context, this is an alternating-o¤ers framework where the MNC alternates
in making o¤ers with the two regions. When it is the MNC’s turn to make an
o¤er, it can demand either a particular subsidy from one of the regions or it can
make no demand. When it is the regions’ turn to make an o¤er, they simulta-
neously bid the subsidy they are willing to pay. The result of this bargaining
framework is that the MNC’s payo¤ is the maximum between: a) half of the
after-tax surplus (i.e. externality minus central government tax) it produces in
the winning region; and b) the value of its outside option, given by the after-tax
3Whether the federal tax is on the MNC or on the region does not make any di¤erence in
terms of the payo¤ the MNC and the state get.
4The in-advance setting of the taxes (a federal government take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the
MNC) acts as a commitment device for the federal government not to bargain with the MNC.
Even though we do not prove it here, it seems obvious that because the federal government
cannot prevent the regional subsidies, a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er would provide a higher coun-
try’s welfare than a direct bargaining with the MNC. Furthermore, the central government
commitment is sometimes originated is tax treaties signed decades in advance.
5The bargaining seems a very appropriate framework to analyse this kind of problem
because this is the most common way the MNCs induce di¤erent regions to compete for their
production plants. This aspect has been particularly ignored by the literature, which seems
to have a preference for the use of an auction framework. Furthermore, we assume here that
the regional government cannot pre-commit to subsidies (or taxes) as the federal government
does it. The main justi…cation for this assumption is the fact that an MNC would more easily
accept apre-commitment if it is imposed by a third party (in this case the central government)
than if it is imposed to itself by the region. Thus, we could say that the federal government is
a very good commitment tool for the regions. However, we recognise that it could be worth
investigating the e¤ects that the introduction of some regional pre-commitment power has on
the model’s results.
6We are assuming that each region government does not consider the central government
tax revenue in its own utility function. Obviously, this is not necessarily arealistic assumption
if the way the central government expends this tax revenue result in higher bene…ts for the
competing regions. However, one justi…cation for assuming that can be the existence of a
large number of regions in the country. In this case, each region will get negligible bene…ts
from this central government tax revenue. Indeed, the federal government can expend this
tax revenue in a way that only increases the utility of the regions that are not participating
in the competition for the MNC.
3surplus it produces in the other region.
2.1 Two identical regions
The simplest case is when there is only one type of MNC and both regions are
identical. In this case the externality produced by the MNC is the same in both
regions.
On the one hand, in the absence of central government intervention, the
competition between the regions induces them to o¤er a subsidy equal to the
full externality produced by the MNC. Thus, the MNC obtains a bene…t equal
to the total externality and each region gets zero. The country’s welfare is
obviously also zero.
On the other hand, in the presence of central government intervention, it is
optimal for it to eliminate one region from the competition (by setting a very
high tax if the MNC chooses this region) and to charge the MNC a tax equal to
the externality it produces in the other region. We will call this an "asymmetric
tax policy"7. Then, the bene…t of the externality is totally absorbed by the
country.
In the previous example there was only one type of MNC. However, it is
usually the case that a variety of MNCs are involved in negotiations with the
di¤erent regions of a country. Then, industrial, technological, as well as, …-
nancial characteristics may produce di¤erences in the externalities created by
each particular MNC. To consider this we allow the existence of two types of
MNCs (i.e. a or b), which can produce di¤erent externalities, but the regions
are still identical. Furthermore, it is usually the case that the central govern-
ment has less information than the regions about the externalities produced by
the MNCs8. This feature is captured by assuming that it knows the externality
each type of MNC can produce, but it does not know the realisation of the
MNC type. In particular, it only knows that an MNC of type a shows up with
probability p and an MNC of type b does it with probability 1 ¡ p. On the
contrary, the regions know the MNC’s type showing up at each particular time.
Again, in the decentralised solution (the one without central government
intervention), the subsidy competition allows the MNC to obtain the full bene…t
of the externality whatever its type is. Thus, there is no country’s welfare
derived from the new production plant. However, when the central government
intervenes it is natural to think that, given that both regions are identical, it
should apply a symmetric tax policy. It also seems reasonable to conjecture that
the optimal central government policy is to eliminate one of the regions from the
competition and to apply an appropriate tax on the other one (asymmetric tax
7Under the present case, this same result can be obtained by a "symmetric tax policy"
which consist in charging the same tax in each region, which must be equal to the externality
produced by the MNC.
8While central governments may have just as much (or better) information than regional
governments they would be unable to use it if they have to set the taxes very well in advance.
The result may well be that the information the central governments have at the time of
committing to particular taxes is lower than the one the local governments have when they
bargain with the MNCs.
4policy). Indeed, it could be the case that both tax policies are equally optimal.
In order to know which one of these alternatives is the right one under each
particular setting we use two numerical examples. In both examples we assume
that an MNC of type a generates an externality of £40 and an MNC of type b
one of £20.
Example 1 In the …rst case we additionally assume that the probability of an
MNC of type a showing up is high (say p = 0:8). If this is the case, it pays to get
the full externality from the MNC of type a, even though this is done at the cost
of not attracting the MNC of type b. Thus, the optimal central government tax
in each region in the case of the symmetric tax policy, or in the non-eliminated
region in the case of the asymmetrical one, is equal to the externality produced
by the MNC of type a (£40). Now, the MNC of type b does not come to the
country under any of the tax policies, but the full externality is extracted from
the MNC of type a. Then, both a symmetric and asymmetric tax policies are
equally optimal for the country.
However, a di¤erent result is obtained in the next example.
Example 2 In this second example we assume a low enough p (say p = 0:2)
as to make it optimal for the central government to attract both types of MNCs.
Let’s …rst obtain the country’s welfare under the asymmetric tax policy. In this
case the central government eliminates one region from the competition (say
region 1) and it charges a tax equal to the externality produced by the MNC of
type b (£20) in the remaining one. As a result, the central government obtains
the full externality produced by an MNC of type b. However, the MNC of type a
bargains with the region 1 how to share the after-tax surplus of £209 (equal to
the externality minus the central government tax in this region). As a result of
this bargaining process, region 1 only obtains half of this after-tax surplus, for it
has to give a subsidy of £10 to the MNC. This means that the country’s welfare
is £30 (externality minus subsidy) when an MNC of type a shows up and £20
when an MNC of type b does it.
Let’s now obtain the country’s welfare under the symmetric tax policy. In this
case, the optimal central government tax in each region is equal to the externality
produced by an MNC of type b. As before, the central government obtains all the
externality produced by an MNC of type b. However, in the case that an MNC
of type a shows up, the competition between the regions makes the MNC obtain
the full after-tax surplus of £20. Thus, the country’s welfare is equal to £20
whichever type of MNC shows up and the symmetric tax policy is dominated by
the asymmetric one.
Thus, the following proposition applies.
Proposition 1 When there are two identical regions, two types of MNCs that
produce di¤erent externalities, and it is optimal for the country to attract both
9In this paper, the expression after-tax will refer to the tax imposed by the federal govern-
ment to the MNC.
5of them, a dissimilar treatment of similar regions is the only optimal tax policy.
For it reduces the subsidy competition when the low type of the MNCs shows up.
It is interesting to see that it might be optimal to give di¤erent tax treat-
ments to identical regions. Indeed, there is no way in which this last result can
be achieved though the application of a symmetric tax policy. The reason for
this is straightforward. It is true that setting the same tax in both regions,
equal to the externality produced by an MNC of type b reduces the inter-region
competition when this type of MNC shows up. However, this policy is not very
e¤ective when an MNC of type a shows up, for the MNC then has a binding
outside option that increases the subsidy that the winning region has to pay.
2.2 Two di¤erent regions
Although the explanation of the stylised fact that the central governments give
asymmetric treatments to similar states is the main aim of the paper, it is
interesting to know what we can learn from it when the regions are not similar.
So we now examine the central government’s optimal policy in a more general
setting.
Until now we have assumed that the MNCs do not have any pro…t. However,
given that the addition of MNCs pro…ts makes the model a more general one
without increasing its complexity, hereafter we will do so. Then, the surplus
that an MNC of type i produces in region j (sij) is equal to the sum of its pro…t
and the externality (…ij and eij respectively).
We begin solving the second stage of the game by making a de…nition. When
an MNC of type i (i=a, b) shows up, we de…ne a region j as ’superior’ if
the after-tax surplus in this region is higher or equal than in region k10 (i.e.
sij ¡ gj ¸ sik ¡ gk)11. In addition, if this after-tax surplus is higher or equal
than the surplus abroad (i.e. sij ¸ gj), this region would become the winner of








2 ; sik ¡ gk
i
if sij ¸ gj
0 otherwise
(1)
Thus, if region j is the winner (i.e. the …rst line of expression 1 applies)
the MNC’s payo¤ would be equal to the maximum between half of the after-tax
surplus an MNC of type i produces in the region j (i.e.
sij¡gj
2 ) and the value
of its outside option given by the after-tax surplus it produces in region k (i.e.
sik ¡ gk). On the contrary, if the central government tax on the superior region
is such that the after-tax surplus in region j is lower than the surplus abroad
the MNC does not come to the country (i.e. there is no winner region) and it
gets a payo¤ of zero.
10For simplicitywe will consider thesubscripts j and k as indicatingthe superior and inferior
regions respectively.
11The central government tax is represented by the letter g. Furthermore, for simplicity
we assume that if the previous weak inequality is satis…ed with an equal sign, region j is the
superior one.
6It is obvious that the subsidy that the winning region must pay is such that,






2 ¡ (…ij ¡ gj); (sik ¡ gk) ¡ (…ij ¡ gj)
i
if sij ¸ gj
0 otherwise
(2)
Again, if the central government tax in the superior region is too high the
MNC does not come to the country and the subsidy is equal to zero. In the
upper part of expression 2 it is like if the winning region takes the full after-tax
pro…t (… ij ¡ gj) from the MNC, but then it compensates the MNC by giving
back the payo¤ in expression 1. It is obvious that this subsidy can be a negative
one (i.e., a local tax) and in a lot of cases this will be the case12.
Then, by subtracting the equilibrium subsidy from the externality in region









2 ; sij ¡ gj ¡ (sik ¡ gk)
i
if sij ¸ gj
0 otherwise
(3)
We have already determined all the important analytical expressions of the
second stage of the game. In the …rst stage the central government maximises
the expected country’s welfare. Thus, given that the ex-post country’s welfare
produced by each particular type of MNC that builds a plant in the country is
equal to the central government tax plus the winning region equilibrium payo¤,






2 ; saj ¡ gj ¡ (sak ¡ gk)
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2 ; sbj ¡ gj ¡ (sbk ¡ gk)
´´
(1 ¡ p) if sbj ¸ gj
0 otherwise
)
The previous expression will be useful in order to accomplish our next task.
That is, to determine the optimal central government taxes and to identify the
winning regions under di¤erent parameter values. However, because the setting
of our model includes two types of MNCs and two regions this is a substantially
complex task. Hence, for simplicity, we split this setting into what we call
’economic regimes’. There will be twelve of them, but because of symmetry it
is enough to only analyse the following six:
Economic regime I : sa1 ¸ sa2 ¸ sb2 ¸ sb1 ¸ 0 (5)
12As an example, think of the case where there is no outside option, no federal tax, and no
externality (the surplus is just equal to the MNC’s pro…t). Then, for the state to get half of
this surplus, it has to apply a tax on the MNC.
7Economic regime II : sa1 ¸ sa2 ¸ sb1 ¸ sb2 ¸ 0 (6)
Economic regime III : sa1 ¸ sb2 ¸ sa2 ¸ sb1 ¸ 0 (7)
Economic regime IV : sa1 ¸ sb1 ¸ sa2 ¸ sb2 ¸ 0 (8)
Economic regime V : sa1 ¸ sb1 ¸ sb2 ¸ sa2 ¸ 0 (9)
Economic regime VI : sa1 ¸ sb2 ¸ sb1 ¸ sa2 ¸ 0 (10)
The knowledge of these economic regimes will be helpful at the time of
proving the propositions 2 to 7 and necessary in order to detect the existence of
mismatches between states and MNCs already mentioned in the introduction. In
these propositions we determine the optimal tax policy for each particular match
between regions and MNCs. This procedure guarantee that we are considering
all the possible cases and thus allow us to …nd the optimal tax policies under
di¤erent parameter values. These last results will be summarised at the end of
section 2.2.7. Before moving on, recall that a central government tax policy is
the set of taxes that the central government imposes on the MNC, which as we
already said are conditional on the region the MNC locates its new production
plant.
2.2.1 Tax policy 1
Proposition 2 When the country only attracts one type of MNC, the optimal
tax policy (hereafter tax policy 1) is one that extracts the entire surplus from an
MNC of type a in region 1 and eliminates region 2 from the competition (i.e.
g1 = sa1 and g2 = 1).
Proof. When the country only attracts one type of MNC, the MNC can be
of type a or b. If, on the one hand, only an MNC of type a is attracted, it is
optimal to eliminate region 2 and make it go to region 1 because it generates a
higher surplus there. Then, the optimal tax in region 1 is one that extracts the
full surplus produced by this MNC (i.e. g1 = sa1).
On the other hand, it is not optimal for the central government to only
attract the MNC of type b. First, it is not possible to only attract the MNC of
type b and make it go to region 1. For, in region 1, every tax that is accepted
by an MNC of type b will also be accepted by an MNC of type a, what means
that both MNC will come. Second, it is not possible to only attract the MNC
of type b and make it go to region 2 in economic regimes I, II, and IV, because,
again, every tax that is accepted by an MNC of type b will also be accepted by
an MNC of type a, what will attract both MNCs to the country. Indeed, given
that we attract the MNC of type b to region 2 in economic regimes III, V, and
VI, it would be possible and optimal to also attract an MNC of type a to region
81. Thus, we conclude that it is not optimal to only attract the MNC of type b.
Then, by replacing tax policy 1 into expression 4 the country’s welfare is:
w1 = sa1p (11)
2.2.2 Tax policy 2
Proposition 3 When the country attracts both MNCs and they go to region 1,
the optimal tax policy (hereafter tax policy 2) is to eliminate region 2 from the
competition and to set g1 = sb1.
Proof. First, it is obvious that the two MNCs will not go to region 1 if the
tax in this region is g1 > sb1. Second, given that region 2 is eliminated from
the competition, a reduction of g1 below sb1 would reduce the country’s welfare
whichever type of MNC shows up. Finally, given that the central government
sets g1 = sb1, it is not optimal not to eliminate region 2. For this region would
become a binding outside option, for one or the other MNC depending on the
parameter values, what would reduce the country’s welfare.







p + sb1(1 ¡ p) (12)
2.2.3 Tax policies 3a and 3b
Proposition 4 When the country attracts both MNCs to region 2, the optimal
tax policy is to eliminate region 1 from the competition and to set g2 = sb2
(hereafter tax policy 3a) if sa2 > sb2 (i.e. in economic regimes I, II, and IV) or
g2 = sa2 (hereafter tax policy 3b) if sa2 < sb2 (i.e. in economic regimes III, V,
and VI).
Proof. First, to eliminate region 1 from the competition and to charge
g2 > sb2 when sa2 > sb2 or to charge g2 > sa2 when sa2 < sb2, does not attract
both MNCs to region 2. Second, to charge a tax g2 < sb2 or not to eliminate
region 1 from the competition when sa2 > sb2 results in a lower country’s
welfare. Finally, to charge a tax g2 < sa2 or not to eliminate region 1 from the
competition when sa2 < sb2 also result in a lower country’s welfare.















p + sa2(1 ¡ p) (14)
92.2.4 Tax policy 4
Proposition 5 If sb2 · sa2 (i.e. in economic regimes I, II, and IV) and sa1 ¡
sa2 ¡ sb1 + sb2 ¸ 0, the optimal tax policy (hereafter tax policy 4) that attracts
an MNC of type a to region 1 and one of type b to region 2 is one that sets
g1 = sa1 ¡ sa2 + g2 and g2 = sb2.
Proof. On the one hand, for an MNC of type a to go to region 1 the two
following conditions are necessary.
sa2 ¡ g2 · sa1 ¡ g1 (15)
g1 · sa1 (16)
The …rst of these conditions says that the after-tax surplus of an MNC of
type a must be higher in region 1 than in region 2. The second one imposes
that the tax charged in the region 1 has to be low enough as to make the MNC
of type a prefer region 1 to going abroad.
On the other hand, the similar conditions are necessary for an MNC of type
b to go to region 2. These conditions are given by the following expressions:
sb2 ¡ g2 ¸ sb1 ¡ g1 (17)
g2 · sb2 (18)
Then, by replacing 15 into 17 and rearranging we get the following necessary
condition for a tax policy to induce an MNC of type a to go to region 1 and an
MNC of type b to go to region 2:
sa1 ¡ sa2 ¡ sb1 + sb2 ¸ 0 (19)
On the one hand, it is clear that restriction 19 is always satis…ed in economic
regime I, but this is not always the case in economic regimes II and IV. However,
assuming that restriction 19 is satis…ed, the maximum tax that can be applied
in region 1 that is compatible with restrictions 15 and 16 is,
g1 = min (sa1 ¡ sa2 + g2; sa1) (20)
but because of restriction 18 and that we are assuming sb2 · sa2, this is
equivalent to:
g1 = sa1 ¡ sa2 + g2 (21)
On the other hand, because of 18 and 21 and given that an MNC of type
a has to go to region 1 and one of type b has to go to region 2, a reduction in
g2 bellow sb2 will decrease the country’s welfare whichever type of MNC shows
up. For when an MNC of type b shows up, it is obvious that a reduction in g2
reduces the country’s welfare because, under the present tax policy, this type
of MNC goes to region 2. Furthermore, when an MNC of type a shows up, a
reduction in g2 produces a fall in g1 and so a reduction of the country’s welfare.
Thus, we can conclude that given g1 = sa1¡sa2+g2, it is optimal to set g2 = sb2.
10Similarly, given g2 = sb2, a reduction in g1 bellow g1 = sa1 ¡sa2 + g2 would
not increase the country’s welfare if an MNC of type b shows up. Indeed, it
would reduce it if an MNC of type a shows up. This means that, if g2 = sb2,
g1 = sa1 ¡ sa2 + g2 would be the optimal tax to be set in region 1.
Then, replacing tax policy 4 into expression 4 the country’s welfare is13:
w4 = [sa1 ¡ (sa2 ¡ sb2)]p+ sb2(1¡ p) (22)
2.2.5 tax policy 5
Proposition 6 If sb2 ¸ sa2 (i.e. in economic regimes III, V, and VI), the
optimal tax policy (hereafter tax policy 5) that attracts an MNC of type a to
region 1 and an MNC of type b to region 2 is one that sets g1 = sa1 and
g2 = sb2.
Proof. Because we are looking for the optimal tax policy that results in the
MNC of type a going to region 1 and the MNC of type b to region 2, restrictions
15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 have to be satis…ed. However, given that now we assume
sb2 ¸ sa2, restriction 19 is always satis…ed.
As before, the maximum tax that can be applied in region 1 such that the
MNC of type a chooses this site is given by expression 20. Indeed, since the
application of this tax does not upper bound the tax to be charged in region
2, this is the optimal tax to be set in region 1. For, a higher tax would not be
able to attract an MNC of type a to region 1, and a lower one would produce
a lower country’s welfare when an MNC of type a shows up and it would not
produce a higher one when an MNC of type b does it.
Furthermore, it is optimal for the central government to set g2 = sb2 and
extract the full surplus of an MNC of type b in region 2. For a higher tax would
fail in attracting an MNC of type b to region 2 and a lower one would reduce
the country’s welfare whichever MNC shows up. Then, given that this is the
optimal tax in region 2, the expression 20 turns into g1 = sa1.
Then, by replacing tax policy 5 into expression 4 the country’s welfare is:
w5 = sa1p + sb2(1 ¡ p) (23)
Before moving onto the next proposition let’s make the following two de…n-
itions, which will also be useful in section 3:
De…nition 1 We will de…ne a tax policy as dominated if there are no parameter
values for which this tax policy provides the highest country’s welfare.
De…nition 2 We will de…ne a tax policy as regime-dominated in a particular
economic regime if there are no parameter values, compatible with this economic
regime, for which this tax policy provides the highest country’s welfare.
Then, we continue with proposition 7:
13Expression 22 shows that the country’s welfare in the case an MNC of type a shows up
is only given by g1. This is explained by the fact that the after tax surplus generated by an
MNC of type a in region 1 is equal to the outside option and so the region 1 has to allow the
MNC to appropriate all of this after tax surplus by charging a tax equal to zero.
112.2.6 tax policy 6
Proposition 7 It is not optimal for the central government, under any eco-
nomic regime, to attract both an MNC of type a to region 2 and an MNC of
type b to region 1.
Proof. Similarly to our proof to proposition 5, for the MNC of type b to go
to region 1 and the MNC of type a to go to region 2 the four following conditions
are necessary:
sb2 ¡ g2 · sb1 ¡ g1 (24)
g1 · sb1 (25)
sa2 ¡ g2 ¸ sa1 ¡ g1 (26)
g2 · sa2 (27)
Then, by replacing 24 into 26and rearranging we get the following inequality:
sa1 ¡ sa2 ¡ sb1 + sb2 · 0 (28)
Thus, the present tax policy is feasible only if restriction 28 is satis…ed.
However, restriction 28 is never satis…ed in economic regime I, III, V, and VI
and so we only need to look at economic regimes II and IV.
From restriction 25 we know that the maximum tax that can be imposed in
region 1 is g1 = sb1. Furthermore, if sb2 · sa2 (which is the case in economic
regimes II and IV), the maximum tax in region 2 that satis…es restriction 24 is
g2 = sb2. In other words, it must be the case that g1 · sb1 and g2 · sb2.
However, the taxes in regions 1 and 2 must not be lower than sb1 and sb2
respectively. In the case of the tax in region 1 we have that, since we are looking
for a case where an MNC of type b goes to region 1, a reduction of g1 below sb1
would produce a fall in the welfare obtained from an MNC of type b. Indeed, by
increasing the value of the outside option for an MNC of type a, a reduction in
g1 below sb1 would also make necessary to reduce the tax in region 2 producing
a lower country’s welfare when this last MNC shows up. The same argument
applies to explain the fact that it is not optimal to reduce the tax in region 2
bellow sb2.
Then, from the previous two paragraphs we get that the optimal tax policy to
achieve this particular match between MNCs and regions is to set g1 = sb1 and
g2 = sb2.
Now, to determine what the country’s welfare is under this tax policy we
need to know whether the outside options are binding or not. On the one hand,
it is obvious that, since g1 = sb1 and g2 = sb2, region 2 does not constitute a
binding outside option for an MNC of type b14. On the other hand, region 1 will




¸ sa1 ¡ g1 (29)
14Region 2 is not a binding outside option for an MNC of type b if
sb1¡g1
2 ¸ sb2 ¡g2.
12Moreover, by replacing g1 = sb1 and g2 = sb2 into 29, and rearranging we
get the following expression.
2sa1 ¡ 2sb1 + sb2 ¡ sa2 · 0 (30)
Thus, when inequality 30 is not satis…ed in economic regimes II and IV,
region 1 is a binding outside option for an MNC of type a. In this case the
country’s welfare is:
w = [sa2 ¡ sb2 ¡ (sa1 ¡ sb1)]p+ sb1(1¡ p)
The welfare in the last expression is lower than the one in expression 11
for every parameter values in economic regimes II and IV where the expression
30 is not satis…ed. On the contrary, when inequality 30 is satis…ed in economic
regimes II and IV the region 1 is not a binding outside option for an MNC of type






p + sb1(1 ¡ p) (31)
Again, in economic regime II and IV this country’s welfare is lower than the
one in expression 12. Then, we can conclude that tax policy 6 is a dominated
one and so it is not optimal to attract an MNC of type a to region 2 and an
MNC of type b to region 1.
3 Results
The …rst result of our paper was stated in proposition 1 at the beginning of
our model. By this proposition, we were able to explain the stylised fact that
central governments give asymmetric tax treatments to similar regions. It seems
striking that a symmetric treatment of similar states is not an optimal tax
policy. Furthermore, this is not just a positive result, but also a very interesting
normative one.
We can now move on to see what are the main results obtained from the
previous six propositions, where we have determined the complete set of non-
dominated tax policies (i.e. tax policies 1, 2, 3a, 4, and 5). These results are
summarised in the …rst …ve columns of table 1. That is, for each tax policy
(column 1) we specify the tax imposed in each region (columns 2 and 3) and the
distribution of the MNCs between the regions (columns 4 and 5). It is interesting
to …nd the precise parameter values for which each of these tax policies is the
optimal one, but this would be easier if, as a …rst step, we get rid of the tax
policies that are regime-dominated in each particular economic regime. Indeed,
to do that will help us to detect the existence of mismatches, already mentioned
in the introduction, between states and MNCs. The result of this …rst step
is shown in the last column of table 1 where there is a summary of only the
economic regimes where each particular tax policy is not regime-dominated (see
appendix 1).
13Then, to know the precise parameter values for which each tax policy is the
optimal one, a comparison of the country’s welfare generated by each of them
has to be done. However, it is obvious from the last column of table 1 that this
comparison is not necessary between some particular pair of policies because
there is no overlapping in the economic regimes where they are not dominated
(e.g. tax policy 3a is non-dominated in economic regime I and tax policy 5 is
non-dominated in economic regimes III, V, and VI). Thus, a summary of the
necessary comparisons is shown in table 2, which must be read as follows. For
example, if all the expressions in column 1 of table 2 were higher than zero, tax
policy 4 would be the optimal one. In a similar way, if all the expressions in
row 4 of table 2 were lower than zero, tax policy 4 would be the optimal one.
The same interpretation applies for the remaining rows and columns.
We are now in condition to look for the existence of mismatches between
states and MNCs produced by the central government policy. Recall that by
mismatch we mean a situation where, even though one MNC is more productive
in one region, it is optimal for the country to attract it to the other one. Indeed,
the existence of mismatches is an interesting result that contrasts with the
solution when there is no central government intervention, where this never
happens.
By using a numerical example extracted from economic regime I, we can see
a case where a mismatch is created. Thus, assume that sa1 = 40, sa2 = 34,
sb2 = 20, sb1 = 10, and p = 0:5. In this case, the central government will …nd it
optimal to implement tax policy 3a with the consequence that both MNCs will
go to region 2 and region 1 will be eliminated from the competition. Then, it is
clear that there will be a mismatch between the MNC of type a and the region
2, for that type of MNC produces a higher surplus in region 1. This is just an
example of the existence of a mismatch, but as it is stated in the note to table
1, it could also appear in economic regimes II, IV, and V.
The mismatches are produced because the central government faces a trade
o¤ between reducing the negative e¤ects the inter-region subsidy competition
has on the country’s welfare and reaching the best match between region and
MNC. More speci…cally, the fact of having imperfect information about the
realisation of the MNC’s type leaves the central government with only two tools
(the taxes in each of the two regions, i.e. g1 and g2) to reach four targets
(to achieve the best match between regions and MNCs and to extract the full
surplus that each MNC produces in its best match). This problem would not
have existed if the central government had perfect information. For in this
case it could have set the taxes conditional on both the region and the MNC’s
type (i.e. ga1, ga2, gb1, and gb2), in which case the central government would
have had four tools. As a result each type of MNC would have gone to its
best matching region and the full surplus would be extracted by the central
government.
Finally, Another interesting result of the present model is that, as can be
seen in table 1, the after-tax surplus will be positive only when tax policies 2,
3a, or 4 are the optimal ones and always in the case an MNC of type a shows
up. This also implies that there will be no after-tax surplus in economic regimes
14III and VI. That is, when the highest two surpluses are produced by the MNC
of type a in region 1 and the MNC of type b in region 2, in that order. In other
words, when each region has advantage only for the MNC from which it gets the
highest surplus (MNC a for region 1 and b for region 2), which we can identify as
a case of regional high specialisation and low competition. An extreme example
of this particular case would be when the regions are dissimilar but perfectly
symmetric (e.g. the MNC of type a produces 40 in region 1 and 0 in region 2
and the MNC of type b produces 0 in region 1 and 40 in region 2).
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With the aim of analysing a very important aspect of the last 20 years we have
developed a simple model where an MNC bargains with two local governments
to decide the location of its new production plant. The creation of a positive
surplus to the host site induces the local governments to get involved in subsidy
competition. It is clear that this competition reduces the bene…ts of the winning
region in favour of higher pro…ts for the MNC, with the consequent reduction
in the country’s welfare. Thus, it is natural to ask: Why does the central
government not eliminate or at least limit this competition?
In fact, as we have already mentioned in the introduction, there is some ev-
idence suggesting that central governments are intervening in this competition
process. The clearest example is the persistence with which central governments
give asymmetric tax treatments to similar regions, what became the main mo-
tivation for the present paper.
In our model an imperfectly informed government moves …rst by setting the
taxes that the MNCs have to pay in each region. Then, at the time a particular
MNC has to decide where to build a new production plant, it bargains with the
two regions the amount of subsidy to be paid. We have solved the model and
found some interesting results. Not surprisingly we …nd that it is optimal for
the central government to give relative advantages to some regions in order to
reduce the inter-region competition and to increase the country’s welfare. This
can be seen as an explanation of the existence of the so-called special economic
zones or other economic regimes that create asymmetries between the regions
of a particular country.
Indeed, we …nd out that under some particular conditions an asymmetric
treatment of similar regions is the only optimal policy. This is the case because,
when there are two types of MNCs and it is optimal for the country to attract
both of them, a similar tax treatment makes the losing region become a binding
outside option for the high type MNC, increasing in this way the subsidy paid
by the winning region.
We also …nd that in several occasions the central government intervention
generates a mismatch between region and MNC. This mismatch is produced
when, even though one MNC is more productive in one region, it is optimal for
the country to make it go to the other one. It is striking that, in our model, the
existence of mismatches comes as a result of the central government applying a
policy that maximises the country’s welfare.
Let’s take a look at what drives this last result. The mismatches are pro-
duced because the central government faces a trade o¤ between reducing the
negative e¤ects the inter-region subsidy competition has on the country’s wel-
fare and reaching the best match between region and MNC. More speci…cally,
the fact of having imperfect information about the realisation of the MNC’s
type leaves the central government with only two tools to reach four targets.
Thus, we can say that, given that the subsidies are not observable, this result
is driven by the fact that the central government has imperfect information.
However, it is not so obvious that the result also depends, as we have as-
16sumed, on the fact that the central government has less information than the
regions. It is possible to think of situations where this last assumption would
not hold. Then, what would the optimal policy be in a setting where, even
though the central government has imperfect information, it is more informed
than the regions? It would be interesting to see whether or not the results still
apply, and/or under what conditions, in this new and less restrictive setting.
However, to model this last setting, a three-player bargaining framework with
imperfect information is needed, what demands an adaptation of Bolton and
Winston’s (1993) bargaining approach.
Another possible extension to the present model would come out by allowing
tax pre-commitment capability, not only to the central government, but also to
the regions. In the case that this last setting is the appropriate one, it could
be modelled by the use of a three-stage game. In the …rst stage the central
government pre-commits to taxes and in the second one the regions. They
have the same information as the central government and decide whether to
pass a law or not to pre-commit to subsidies (taxes). In the third stage, the
regional governments, which now have perfect information, are bound to their
commitment or use bargaining. It seems worth doing this and the previous
extension, but this should be combined with some empirical research to …nd out
which one is the most appropriate setting.
Finally, two main contributions of the present paper are worth mention-
ing. The …rst one is the inclusion of the central government intervention in
the inter-region competition process. This, as we have already mentioned was
largely ignored by the literature so far. The second one is the use of a bar-
gaining framework as the tool chosen by the MNC to stimulate the inter-region
competition, which seems to us the most appropriate one for this particular
setting.
5 Appendix
To …nd the economic regimes for which each tax policy is not regime-dominated
we proceed by eliminating all the economic regimes where each tax policy is
regime-dominated. To do this we have tocompare the country’s welfareprovided
by every tax policy in every economic regime. The result is as follows:
Tax policy 1 is regime-dominated in economic regimes III, V, and VI (by
tax policy 5). Tax policy 2 is regime-dominated in economic regimes III and
VI (by tax policy 5). Tax policy 3a is regime-dominated in economic regimes
II and IV (by tax policy 4); and in economic regimes III, V, and VI (by tax
policy 5). Tax policy 3b is regime-dominated in every economic regime (by tax
policy 3a in economic regimes I, II, and IV and by tax policy 5 in economic
regimes III, V, and VI). The application of tax policy 4 in economic regimes
III, V, and VI will not attract the MNC of type a to the country and so it will
be regime-dominated (by tax policy 5). In economic regimes I, II, and IV, tax
policy 5 is equivalent to tax policy 3a and so it is possible to ignore it in these
economic regimes and just to refer to tax policy 3a.
176 Bibliography
Adams, L. and P. Régibeau (2001). ”Optimal Trade Policy in the Presence of
DFI and Internal Subsidy Competition.”
Barros, P. P. and L. Cabral (2000). ”Competing for Foreign Direct Invest-
ment.” Review of International Economics 8(2): 360-371.
Bolton, P. and M. D. Whinston (1993). ”Incomplete Contracts, Vertical
Integration, and Supply Assurance.” The Review of Economic Studies 60(1):
121-148.
Bond, E. W. and L. Samuelson (1986). ”Tax Holidays as Signals.” The
American Economic Review 76(4): 820-826.
Chandler, M. and M. Trebilcock (1986). Comparative survey of industrial
policies in selected OECD countries. Economics of industrial policy and strat-
egy. D. C. McFetridge. Toronto, Royal Commission on Economic Union and
Development Prospects for Canada. 5.
Doyle, C. and S. V.Wijnbergen (1984). ”Taxation of Foreign Multinationals:
A Sequential Bargaining Approach to Tax Holidays.” Institute for International
Economic Studies(Seminal Paper No. 284).
Easson, A. (2001). "Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment Part II:
Design Considerations." Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 55(8):
365.
Huzinga, H. (1995). ”Foreign investment incentives and international cross-
hauling of capital.” Canadian Journal of Economics XXIV(3): 711-716.
ILO database on export processing zones. International Labour Organiza-
tion, Sectorial Activities Department, 2003.
King, I., P. McAfee, et al. (1993). ”Industrial blackmail: Dynamic tax
competition and public investment.” Canadian Journal of Economics 26: 590-
608.
King, I. and L. Welling (1992). ”Commitment, e¢ciency and footloose
…rms.” Economica 59: 63-73.
Litwack J. M. and Y. Qian (1998). "Balanced or unbalanced development:
Special economic zones as catalysts for transition." Journal of Comparative














Tax imposed on each 
region 




   
1 g  
 






1  1 1 a s g =   ¥ = 2 g   a    I, II, and IV
 
2  1 1 b s g =   ¥ = 2 g   a, b    I, II, IV, and V 
3a  ¥ = 1 g   2 2 b s g =     a, b  I
a 
4  ) ( 2 2 1 1 g s s g a a - - =   2 2 b s g =   a  b  I, II
b, and IV
b 
5  1 1 a s g =   2 2 b s g =   a  b  III, V
b, and VI 
 
Note: The superscripts a and b on the number identifying the economic regime 
specifies the type of MNC for which the particular tax policy does not reach the 










Table 2: Parameter values under which each tax policy is the optimal one 
 
  It provides a higher welfare than 
  1  2  3a 
1    0
2
1
1 1 > -
+
b
a b s p




2 2 1 > -
+ -
b





















s b a a
b  
0 1 2 1 2 > - + - b b a a s s s s    













a b s p
s s
s s  
* 0 3 2 2 2 1 > + - b a a s s s  
5    ( ) ( ) 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 > - + - + b b b b a s s p s s s    
 
* Recall from proposition 5 that for tax policy 4 to be the optimal one we also need 
0 2 1 2 1 ‡ + - - b b a a s s s s  to be satisfied, which is not always the case in economic regimes 
II and IV. 
 
 